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Abstract
We present an analytically tractable general equilibrium business cycle model that features
micro-level investment lumpiness. We prove an exact irrelevance proposition which provides
su±cient conditions on preferences, technology, and the ¯xed cost distribution such that any
positive upper support of the ¯xed cost distribution yields identical equilibrium dynamics
of the aggregate quantities normalized by their deterministic steady state values. We also
give two conditions for the ¯xed cost distribution, under which lumpy investment can be
important to a ¯rst-order approximation: (i) The steady-state elasticity of the adjustment
rate is large so that the extensive margin e®ect is large. (ii) More mass is on low ¯xed costs
so that the general equilibrium price feedback e®ect is small.
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In this paper, we present an analytically tractable general equilibrium business cycle model that
incorporates micro-level convex and nonconvex adjustment costs. Recent empirical studies
have documented that nonconvexities of microeconomic capital adjustment are widespread
phenomena. Examining a 17-year sample of large, continuing US manufacturing plants, Doms
and Dunne (1998) ¯nd that typically more than half of a plant's cumulative investment occurs
in a single episode. In addition, they ¯nd that long periods of relatively small changes are
interrupted by investment spikes. Using the Longitudinal Research Database, Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) ¯nd that about 8 percent of observations entail an investment rate near zero.
These observations of inaction are complemented by periods of rather intensive adjustment of
the capital stock. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) also estimate structural parameters of a rich
speci¯cation of convex and nonconvex adjustment costs.
Given the above evidence, an important question is whether micro-level nonconvexities
matter for aggregate macroeconomic dynamics.1 This question is under signi¯cant debate in
the literature. In a seminal study, Thomas (2002) challenges the previous partial equilibrium
analyses (e.g., Caballero et al. (1995), Cooper et al. (1999), and Caballero and Engel (1999)) by
providing a general equilibrium model with lumpy investment.2 She applies the Dotsey, King,
and Wolman (1999) method and shows quantitatively that lumpy investment is irrelevant for
business cycles. Subsequently, Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) build more general models
and use a di®erent numerical method (Krusell and Smith (1998)) to solve the models.3 They
still obtain a similar ¯nding. Their key insight is that the general equilibrium price feedback
e®ect o®sets changes in aggregate investment demand.4 However, some researchers remain
unconvinced by the Khan-Thomas ¯nding. Bachmann et al. (2008) and Gourio and Kashyap
(2007) argue that both ¯xed adjustment costs and general equilibrium price movements are
important for business cycle analysis. The relative importance of these two e®ects is sensitive to
1Embedding a partial equilibrium model similar to Abel and Eberly (1998) in a continuous-time general
equilibrium framework, Miao (2008) studies the e®ect of corporate tax policy on long-run equilibrium in the
presence of ¯xed costs and irreversibility.
2Veracierto (2002) embeds the partial equilibrium costly irreversibility model of Abel and Eberly (1996) in
a general equilibrium business cycles model. Wang and Wen (2009) present a general equilibrium model with
irreversible investment to study aggregate and ¯rm-level volatility.
3Miao (2006) proves the existence of sequential competitive equilibrium for the Krusell-Smith-style incomplete
markets economy with heterogeneous agents. However, it is an open question whether or not the Krusell-Smith-
type recursive equilibrium exists. See Heathcote et al. (2009) for a survey of heterogeneous agents models.
4House (2008) ¯nds an approximate irrelevance result numerically in a di®erent setup. In his model, the source
of the irrelevance result is not the general equilibrium price movements, but is the nearly in¯nite intertemporal
substitution for the timing of investment resulting from long-lived capital.
1calibration. Using the Dotsey et al. (1999) method as in Thomas (2002), Gourio and Kashyap
(2007) calibrate a larger size of ¯xed adjustment costs, and argue that for the extensive margin
e®ect to be large, the ¯xed cost distribution must be compressed in the sense that many ¯rms
face roughly the same sized ¯xed costs.
One reason causing the debate is due to the complexity of the general equilibrium models
with heterogeneous ¯rms in this literature. Researchers have to apply complicated numerical
methods to solve these models.5 There is no general theoretical result for comparison. With-
out a theoretical result under explicitly stated assumptions, one may doubt the accuracy and
generality of numerical solutions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no accuracy test of
the Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) method applied in the literature of equilibrium mod-
els with lumpy investment. In addition, den Haan (2010b) points out that the accuracy test
of the Krusell-Smith method based on the R2 and the standard error is inadequate and has
°aws. There is also no comparison of numerical solutions obtained from these two methods
in the lumpy investment literature. Thus, it is important to develop a reference model that
can deliver an explicit characterization of equilibrium. This characterization can be used not
only for establishing theoretical results, but also for obtaining accurate and e±cient numerical
solutions.
In the present paper, we propose such an analytically tractable general equilibrium model to
understand the aggregate implications of various forms of adjustment costs. Our model features
both convex and nonconvex adjustment costs. Firms face aggregate labor-augmenting technol-
ogy shocks and investment-speci¯c technology shocks.6 In addition, ¯rms face idiosyncratic
¯xed cost shocks, resulting in a generalized (S,s) investment rule as in Caballero and Engel
(1999). Our model is similar to the Khan and Thomas (2003) model with two main di®erences.
First, we assume that the ¯rm-level production function has constant returns to scale rather
than decreasing returns to scale. This assumption makes the aggregate production function
have constant returns to scale, consistent with the real business cycle (RBC) literature. Second,
we assume that a ¯rm's ¯xed costs are proportional to its existing capital stock rather than
labor costs. These two assumptions allow us to exploit the homogeneity property of ¯rm value
to derive a closed-form solution for the generalized (S,s) investment rule. They also allow us to
derive exact aggregation so that we can represent aggregate equilibrium dynamics by a system
5Recently, researchers have developed some new numerical methods to solve models with heterogeneous
agents. These methods are summarized in the January 2010 issue of the Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control. den Haan (2010a) provides a comparison of these methods when applied to the Krusell and Smith
(1998) model. It is interesting to see how these methods are applied to solve the lumpy investment model.
6Greenwood et al. (2000) and Fisher (2006) emphasize that investment-speci¯c technology shocks are impor-
tant for business cycles.
2of nonlinear di®erence equations as in the RBC literature. In particular, the distribution of
capital matters only to the extent of its mean. We then prove that the competitive equilibrium
is constrained e±cient in the sense that if a social planner decides allocations taken ¯rm-level
convex and nonconvex adjustment costs as given, then the optimal allocations are the same as
those in a competitive equilibrium. This result also implies that a recursive equilibrium exists
and unique, which provides the theoretic foundation for a recursive method to solve the model
numerically.
The bene¯t of our modelling is that we do not need to use a complicated numerical method
(e.g., Krusell and Smith (1998)) to approximate the distribution of capital. Because we char-
acterize equilibrium dynamics by a system of nonlinear di®erence equations, we can use a
standard numerical method to obtain accurate solutions. In particular, we apply the second-
order approximation method (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)), which proves quite e±cient
and accurate for analyzing business cycles (see Aruoba et al. (2006)). In addition, we can
also use the standard log-linear approximation method to °esh out intuition transparently by
pencil and paper. Both methods can be easily implemented numerically using the publicly
available package { Dynare. The cost of our modelling is that our model cannot address dis-
tributional asymmetry and nonlinearity emphasized by Caballero et al. (1995). Nevertheless,
our model is still rich enough for us to analyze business cycles with the essential feature of
micro-level lumpiness, but also is tractable enough for us to analyze theoretically the e®ects
of intensive margin, extensive margin, and general equilibrium price movements, which are the
most important elements emphasized in the literature.
We derive the following main results. First, we prove an exact irrelevance proposition:
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, preferences are represented by a time-additive
expected utility function consistent with balanced-growth path, and the idiosyncratic ¯xed
cost shocks are drawn independently and identically from a power function distribution, then
any positive upper support of the ¯xed cost distribution yields identical equilibrium dynamics
of the aggregate quantities normalized by their deterministic steady-state values.
Second, we derive conditions under which lumpy investment is important for aggregate
dynamics to a ¯rst order approximation. Essentially, we need the extensive margin e®ect to be
large and the general equilibrium price feedback e®ect to be small. We show that the extensive
margin e®ect is determined by the steady-state elasticity of the adjustment rate with respect
to the investment trigger. The larger is this elasticity, the larger is the extensive margin e®ect.
The general equilibrium price feedback e®ect is determined by preferences and the steady-state
ratio of the option value of waiting to the price of capital. When the elasticity of intertemporal
3substitution is large, the interest rate feedback e®ect is small. When the ¯xed cost distribution
is more right skewed (i.e. more ¯rms have small ¯xed costs), the option value of waiting is
larger, leading to a weaker general equilibrium wage feedback e®ect.
Third, we show numerically that introducing ¯xed costs to a model with convex adjustment
costs raises business cycle volatility, but reduces persistence of output, consumption, invest-
ment, and hours. In addition, when lumpy investment becomes more important, it brings
business cycle moments closer to those in the standard frictionless RBC model.
Our theoretical results may reconcile some of the debate and some of the numerical ¯ndings
in the literature. For example, Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) ¯nd that when they increase
the maximal ¯xed cost by 10 folds, the equilibrium dynamics nearly have no change. This is
due to the fact that they assume a uniform distribution of ¯xed costs and a nearly constant-
returns-to-scale production function (their calibrated value of returns to scale is 0.905 or 0.896).
For the maximal size of ¯xed costs to matter, we need the production function to have high
curvature as shown numerically by Gourio and Kashyap (2007) and Bachmann et al. (2008).
Gourio and Kashyap (2007) also argue that the ¯xed cost distribution must be compressed.
We show that this feature of the distribution is not essential. What is essential is that the
¯xed cost distribution must be right skewed and must have a high steady-state elasticity of the
adjustment rate.
We emphasize that the size of total ¯xed costs is not essential for the lumpy investment to
be important. Gourio and Kashyap (2007) argue that Khan and Thomas calibrated ¯xed costs
are too small and that raising the size of total ¯xed costs will make lumpy investment more
important. By contrast, we use numerical examples to show that even the size of ¯xed costs is
smaller, lumpy investment can be more important for the reason discussed before.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes equilibrium properties. Section 4 provides numerical results. Section 5 concludes. An
appendix contains all proofs.
2 The Model
We consider an in¯nite horizon economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;2;:::: There
is a continuum of heterogeneous production units, indexed by j and distributed uniformly over
[0;1]: We identify a production unit with a ¯rm or a plant. There is a continuum of identical
households, who trade all ¯rms' shares. Each ¯rm is subject to aggregate labor-augmenting
productivity shocks and investment-speci¯c technology shocks. In addition, each ¯rm is subject
4to idiosyncratic shocks to ¯xed adjustment costs of investments. To focus on the implications
of ¯xed costs for business cycles, we abstract from long-run growth. It is straightforward to
incorporate growth because our model assumptions are consistent with balanced growth.
2.1 Firms
All ¯rms have an identical production technology that combines labor and capital to produce
output. Speci¯cally, if ¯rm j owns capital K
j
t and hires labor N
j
t ; it produces output Y
j
t












where At represents aggregate labor-augmenting technology shocks and follows a Markov pro-
cess given by:




Here, ½A 2 (0;1); ¾A > 0 and eA;t is an identically and independently distributed (iid) standard
normal random variable. Assume that F is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously
di®erentiable, and satis¯es the usual Inada conditions. In addition, it has constant returns to
scale.
Each ¯rm j may make investment I
j
t to increase its existing capital stock K
j
t. Investment
incurs both nonconvex and convex adjustment costs. As in Uzawa (1969), Baxter and Crucini
(1993), and Jermann (1998), capital accumulation follows the law of motion:
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where ± is the depreciation rate and © represents convex adjustment costs. To facilitate ana-




x1¡µ + &; (3)
where Ã > 0 and µ 2 (0;1): Nonconvex adjustment costs are ¯xed costs that must be paid if and
only if the ¯rm chooses to invest. As in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), we measure these costs





t; which is independent of the amount of investment. As will be clear later, this
7There are several ways to model ¯xed adjustment costs in the literature. Fixed costs may be proportional to
the demand shock (Abel and Eberly (1998)), pro¯ts (Caballero and Engel (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006)), or labor costs (Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008)).
5modelling of ¯xed costs is important to ensure that ¯rm value is linearly homogenous. Following
Caballero and Engel (1999), we assume that »
j
t is identically and independently drawn from
a distribution with density Á over [0;»max] across ¯rms and across time. These idiosyncratic
costs cause ¯rm heterogeneity.




















where wt is the wage rate, and zt represents aggregate investment-speci¯c technology shocks.
Here 1I
j
t 6=0 is an indicator function taking value 1 if I
j
t 6= 0; and value 0, otherwise. Assume zt
follows a Markov process given by:




where ½z 2 (0;1); ¾z > 0; and ez;t is an iid standard normal random variable. All random
variables At, zt and »
j
t are mutually independent.
















subject to (2) and (4). Here, ¯s¤t+s=¤t is the stochastic discount factor between period t and
t + s: We will show later that ¤t+s is a household's marginal utility in period t + s:
2.2 Households





¯tU (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)
#
; (6)
where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, and U is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and
continuously di®erentiable function that satis¯es the usual Inada conditions. Each household
chooses consumption Ct; labor supply Nt, and share holdings ®
j
t+1 to maximize utility (6)



















t dj + wtNt: (7)












U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt) = ¤t; (9)
U2 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt) = ¤twt: (10)
Equations (8)-(9) imply that the stock price P
j
t is given by the discounted present value of
dividends as in equation (5). In addition, ¤t is equal to the marginal utility of consumption.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium






tgt¸0; fCt;Ntgt¸0; and prices fwt;P
j
t gt¸0 for j 2 [0;1]
constitute a competitive equilibrium if the following conditions are satis¯ed:















t+1gt¸0 maximizes utility in (6) subject to the
budget constraint (7).



































We start by analyzing a single ¯rm's optimal investment policy, holding prices ¯xed. We then
conduct aggregation and characterize equilibrium aggregate dynamics by a system of nonlinear
di®erence equations. We show that the equilibrium is constrained e±cient. Next, we analyze
steady state and prove an exact irrelevance result. Finally, we log-linearize the equilibrium
dynamic system and examine the conditions under which lumpy investment can be important.
3.1 Optimal Investment Policy














At = wt; (12)
7where we de¯ne f (¢) = F (1;¢): This equation reveals that all ¯rms choose the same labor-
capital ratio in that n
j



















where Rt = f(Atnt) ¡ wtnt is independent of j. Note that Rt also represents the marginal






t denote ¯rm j's































The above two equations imply that equity value or ¯rm value are linear in capital K
j
t: We




































































t) = 1 ¡ ± + ©(i
j
t): (16)
Note that Rt and ¤t depend on the current aggregate state (Kt;At;zt) only. Suppose the
equilibrium law of motion for aggregate capital is given by:
Kt+1 = G(Kt;At;zt): (17)














for some function V: We aggregate each ¯rm's price of capital V
j
t and de¯ne the aggregate value
of the ¯rm per unit of capital conditioned on aggregate state (Kt;At;zt) as:




8for some function ¹ V : Because »
j






















































Using this equation, we can characterize a ¯rm's optimal investment policy by a generalized
(S,s) rule (Caballero and Engel (1999)). In so doing, we ¯rst de¯ne marginal Q as the (risk-








Since investment becomes productive with a one period delay, marginal Q is equal to the
discounted expected value of the ¯rm of an additional unit of capital in the next period. In
continuous time, the di®erence between marginal Q and the aggregate price of capital ¹ Vt+1
disappears. Because ¯rm value is linearly homogeneous in capital, Tobin's average Q is equal
to the marginal Q (Hayashi (1982)).





t is related to marginal Q (Abel and Eberly (1994)). Without convex adjustment costs,
©(x) = x and i
j
t is indeterminate unless one assumes decreasing-returns-to-scale technology.
Proposition 1 Firm j's optimal investment policy is characterized by the (S;s) policy in that
there is a unique trigger value »¤




The trigger value »¤


































9Equation (22) says that, at the value »¤
t ; the bene¯t from investment is equal to the ¯xed cost
of investment. The bene¯t from investment increases with Qt and zt: Thus, the investment
trigger »¤
t also increases with Qt and zt: If »¤
t ¸ »max, then the ¯rm always invests. In the
aggregate with a cross section of ¯rms, this means that all ¯rms decide to invest. In the
analysis below, we will focus on an interior solution for which »¤
t < »max:
Note that the investment trigger »¤
t depends on the aggregate state (Kt;At;zt) only. It




t): This observation implies that conditioned
on the aggregate state, the adjustment hazard,
R »¤
t
0 Á(»)d»; is a constant. This result is due
to our assumptions of competitive markets, constant-returns-to-scale production function, and
the iid distribution of »
j
t. When the production function has decreasing returns to scale or
there is monopoly power, the investment trigger »¤
t and the adjustment hazard will depend on
the ¯rm-speci¯c capital stock, as discussed in Caballero et al. (1995), Caballero and Engel
(1999), and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008).
Equation (23) implies that all ¯rms choose an identical target investment level, which is
inconsistent with empirical evidence on investment spikes (Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)).
One way to make investment targets depend on ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics is to introduce a
persistent idiosyncratic productivity shock (Khan and Thomas (2008)). This extension will
complicate our analysis signi¯cantly because in this case the investment trigger »¤
t depends on
the idiosyncratic productivity shock, which makes aggregation complicated.8
Equation (23) shows that the optimal investment level is positively related to marginal Q
if and only if the ¯rm's idiosyncratic shock »
j
t is lower than the trigger value »¤
t; conditioned
on the aggregate state (Kt;At;zt): When »
j
t > »¤
t ; ¯rm j chooses not to invest. This zero
investment is unrelated to marginal Q: As a result, investment may not be related to marginal
Q in the presence of ¯xed adjustment costs, a point made by Caballero and Leahy (1996).
Equation (24) is a type of asset-pricing equation. Ignoring the integration term inside the
conditional expectation operator in equation (24), this equation states that the expected price
of capital or marginal Q is equal to the risk-adjusted present value of the marginal product of
capital. The integration term in (24) re°ects the option value of waiting because of the ¯xed
adjustment costs. When the shock »
j
t > »¤
t; it is not optimal to pay the ¯xed costs to make
investment. Firms will wait to invest until »
j
t · »¤
t and there is an option value of waiting.
8An alternative way is to introduce idiosyncratic investment-speci¯c technology shocks. We have worked out
this extension and proved an exact irrelevance proposition. The analysis is available upon request.
103.2 Aggregation and Equilibrium Characterization
Given the linear homogeneity feature of ¯rm value, we can conduct aggregation tractably. We


















Proposition 2 The aggregate equilibrium sequences fYt; Nt; Ct; It; Kt;Qt;»¤
tgt¸0 are charac-







































U2 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)
U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)
= AtF2 (Kt;AtNt); (29)
Qt = Et
½
¯U1 (Ct+1;1 ¡ Nt+1)
U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)












Equation (25) is identical to (22). We derive equations (26) and (27) by aggregating equa-
tions (2) and (23). Equation (26) shows that aggregate investment rate It=Kt is positively
related to marginal Q as predicted by the standard Q-theory. However, unlike this theory,
marginal Q is not a su±cient statistic for the investment rate. In particular, the aggregate
state (Kt;At;zt) also helps explain the aggregate investment rate besides marginal Q; via its
e®ect on »¤
t:
Equation (28) is the resource constraint. The last term in the equation represents the
aggregate ¯xed adjustment costs. The ¯rst equality of equation (28) gives aggregate output
using a single ¯rm's production function F. This result is primarily due to the constant returns
to scale property of F: The representative household's consumption/leisure choice gives equation
9We omit the standard transversality conditions here.
11(29). Equation (30) is an asset pricing for the price of capital Q: It is obtained from equation
(24). Note that by equations (26) and (25), we can show that the option value of waiting in








Is the competitive equilibrium we studied e±cient? To answer this question, we consider a
social planner's problem in which he faces the same investment frictions as individual ¯rms.
Suppose the planner selects an investment trigger »¤
t such that all ¯rms make investments when
the idiosyncratic ¯xed adjustment cost shock »t · »¤
t: We can then aggregate individual ¯rms'
capital and investments to obtain the resource constraint (28) and the capital accumulation
equation (27). The social planner's problem is to maximize the representative agent's utility
(6) subject to these two equations.
Proposition 3 If Á0 ¸ 0; then the competitive equilibrium allocation and the investment trigger
characterized in Proposition 2 are constrained e±cient in the sense that they are identical to
those obtained by solving a social planner's problem. In addition, the solution is unique.
The condition Á0 ¸ 0 and the assumptions for the preferences and technology given before
ensure that the social planner's problem is a concave problem and hence it has a unique
solution. Proposition 3 is important because we can use it to establish the existence of a
recursive equilibrium for our economy by a standard argument as in Stokey and Lucas (1989).
As a result, it provides the theoretic foundation for applying a recursive method to solve our
model numerically. To the best of our knowledge, no similar result is proven in other models,
e.g., the models in Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) or Bachmann et al. (2008). In addition, it
is also an open question whether or not a recursive equilibrium exists for these models.
3.4 Steady State
We consider a deterministic steady state in which there is no aggregate shock to labor augment-
ing technology and no aggregate shock to investment-speci¯c technology, but there is still id-
iosyncratic ¯xed costs shock. In this case, steady-state aggregate variables (Y;C;N;K;I;Q;»¤)
are deterministic constants by a law of large numbers.
Proposition 4 Consider the lumpy investment model. Suppose ± > & and








12Then the steady-state investment trigger »¤ 2 (0;»max) is the unique solution to the equation:
















The other steady-state values (I;K;C;N) satisfy:
I
K
= (± ¡ &)(1 ¡ µ)Q; (33)




U2 (C;1 ¡ N)
U1 (C;1 ¡ N)
= F2 (K;N); (35)
Q =
¯








The investment trigger »¤ is uniquely determined by equation (31), which states that,
for the aggregate capital stock to be constant over time, new investment must o®set capital
depreciation. The steady-state aggregate price of capital is determined by equation (32), which
follows from equation (25). At this price, a ¯rm is just willing to pay the ¯xed cost to invest
if the shock to its new investment just hits the trigger value »¤.
The other steady-state values (I;K;C;N) are determined by a system of four equations
(33)-(36). In particular, equation (33) implies that the steady-state investment rate increases
with the aggregate price of capital Q. Equation (36) shows that Q must satisfy a steady-state
version of an asset-pricing equation, which states that it is equal to the present value of the
marginal product of capital plus the option value of waiting.
We are unable to derive analytical comparative statics results for the steady sate values of
(I;K;C;N) under general conditions because they are determined by a system of four nonlinear
equations. If we make some speci¯c assumptions on preferences and technology, we have the
following sharp comparative statics results:
Corollary 1 Consider the power function distribution with density Á(») =
´»´¡1
(»max)´; ´ > 0:
Assume that the parameter values are such that the inequality in (38) holds, i.e.,
»max >
h
Ã¡1 (± ¡ &)(1 ¡ µ)
µ µ(1¡µ)
i 1
1¡µ > 0: (37)
13Then the steady-state trigger value is given by:
»¤ =
h




´+1¡µ 2 (0;»max): (38)
In addition, consider the following speci¯cations:
F (K;AN) = K®(AN)1¡®; ® 2 (0;1); (39)
U (C;1 ¡ N) =
(
C1¡°
1¡° v(1 ¡ N) if ° > 0;6= 1
log(C) + v(1 ¡ N) if ° = 1
; (40)
where v is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously di®erentiable, and satis¯es the


























As »max increases, the power function distribution is more spread out. Thus, less ¯rms
will adjust capital for a given investment trigger. To raise the aggregate investment rate to
compensate capital depreciation, the steady-state investment trigger »¤ must rise, as shown
in equation (38). As a result, the steady-state investment rate I=K and Q increase with
»max: Under the additional assumptions on preferences and technology, both I and K decrease
with »max; but K decreases faster than I: This in turn implies that the steady-state output
Y and consumption C decrease with »max: In addition, the steady-state rental rate of capital
R increases with »max, but the steady-state wage rate w decreases with »max because capital
becomes relatively scarce.
The surprising result is that the steady-state values of R=Q; I=Y;C=Y and N are indepen-
dent of »max: An important assumption for this result is that the distribution of the ¯xed costs
is a power function, which has a homogeneity property. Our assumed functions for preferences
and technology also have a homogeneity property. These two homogeneity properties are key
to the independence result. We emphasize that the assumptions on preferences and technology
in Corollary 1 are standard in macroeconomics and are consistent with balanced growth (e.g.,
King et al. (2002)). We next use Corollary 1 to study aggregate dynamics.
3.5 An Exact Irrelevance Result
We normalize an aggregate variable by its steady-state value characterized in Proposition 4.
We let ~ Xt = Xt=X denote this normalized value of Xt when its deterministic steady-state value
is X: We have the following irrelevance result:
14Proposition 5 Suppose the assumptions in Corollary 1 are satis¯ed. Then any maximal ¯xed
cost »max > 0 does not a®ect the equilibrium system of nonlinear di®erence equations that
characterizes aggregate dynamics of the normalized variables f~ Yt; ~ Nt; ~ Ct; ~ It; ~ Kt; ~ Qt; ~ »¤
tgt¸0.
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the maximal ¯xed cost »max > 0 matters for aggregate
dynamics only to the extent that it a®ects the steady state. The system of di®erence equations
that characterizes the normalized variables relative to their steady-state values do not depend
on »max: As a result, »max does not a®ect the second moment and impulse response properties
of the normalized aggregate variables or the logarithms of these variables.
The key to this proposition is that the system of nonlinear di®erence equations for the
normalized equilibrium variables has a certain homogeneity property such that it is fully de-
termined by the steady-state values R=Q; I=Y;C=Y and N; and the model parameters other
than »max: By Corollary 1, these steady state values are also independent of »max: Thus, the
dynamic system is independent of »max: The key condition for this result is that the distribution
of the idiosyncratic ¯xed cost shock is a power function. Other conditions are standard in the
RBC literature. Note that the irrelevance proposition is still valid when we introduce mainte-
nance investment as in Bachmann et al. (2008). The reason is that maintenance investment
is proportional to the capital stock and thus still preserves the homogeneity property of the
equilibrium system discussed above.
We emphasize that this result does not imply that aggregate dynamics with ¯xed adjustment
costs (»max > 0) are the same as those in a model without ¯xed adjustment costs (»max = 0),
because the dynamic systems of the (normalized) aggregate variables in the two models are
di®erent. That is, there is discontinuity when »max moves from 0 to a positive number. Formally,
when »max goes to zero, the economy converges to the model without ¯xed adjustment costs.












Yt = F (Kt;AtNt) = It + Ct; (45)
U2 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)
U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)
= AtF2 (Kt;AtNt); (46)
Qt = Et
½
¯U1 (Ct+1;1 ¡ Nt+1)
U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)
[F1 (Kt+1;At+1Nt+1) + (1 ¡ ± + &)Qt+1]
¾
: (47)
15Clearly, the equilibrium system in Proposition 2 does not converge to the above system as
»max ! 0: For (28) to converge to (45), we need »¤
t = 0: But this implies that It = 0 by (26),
which contradicts with (43).
Importantly, the shape of the ¯xed cost distribution plays an important role in the lumpy
investment model. To analyze this issue more transparently, we next consider a log-linearized
equilibrium system.
3.6 Log-Linearized System
We ¯rst note that the equilibrium wage rate wt = AtF2 (Kt;AtNt) and the equilibrium gross
interest rate rt+1 satis¯es U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt) = Et [¯U1 (Ct+1;1 ¡ Nt+1)rt+1]: Using these two
equations, we log-linearize the dynamic system given in Proposition 2 around the deterministic
steady state and obtain the following proposition after some tedious algebra. We use ^ Xt =
(Xt ¡ X)=X to denote the deviation of a variable Xt from its steady state value X:








































































^ At+1 ¡ ^ wt+1
i
;
Et^ rt+1 = uC;C ^ Ct ¡ uC;N ^ Nt ¡ Et
³
uC;C ^ Ct+1 ¡ uC;N ^ Nt+1
´
; (54)














where we denote uN;C =
CU21(C;1¡N)
U2(C;1¡N) , uN;N =
NU22(C;1¡N)
U2(C;1¡N) , uC;C =
CU11(C;1¡N)
U1(C;1¡N) , and uC;N =
NU12(C;1¡N)
U1(C;1¡N) :
16This proposition demonstrates explicitly how parameters for preferences, technology, and
the ¯xed cost distribution determine the log-linearized equilibrium system. Equation (48) shows
that changes in the investment-speci¯c technology shock or in the price of capital determine
changes in the investment trigger, and thus changes in the likelihood of capital adjustment
and in the number of adjustors. This e®ect is often referred to as the extensive margin e®ect.
Equation (49) shows that changes in the aggregate investment rate are determined by an
intensive margin e®ect and an extensive margin e®ect. The intensive margin e®ect represented
by the expression in the bracket on the right hand side of (49) determines the size of the
aggregate investment rate. The magnitude of the extensive margin e®ect on the aggregate
investment rate is determined by the steady-state elasticity of the adjustment rate with respect
to the investment trigger, »¤Á(»¤)=
R »¤
0 Á(»)d». In order for lumpy investment to matter for
business cycles, the extensive margin e®ect must be large. This requires the elasticity of the
adjustment rate with respect to the investment trigger to be large.10 We will give some examples
in the next section to illustrate this point.
Both the intensive margin and extensive margin e®ects are a®ected by the general equi-
librium price movements because changes in the wage rate and in the interest rate a®ect the
changes in the price of capital, as revealed by equation (53). The change in the interest rate is
determined by preferences. As equation (54) shows, when the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution is larger, the consumption smoothing incentive is weaker, leading to a smaller interest
rate movement.
The magnitude of the wage movements is determined by the preferences and technology
parameters as revealed by equation (55). Equation (53) shows that the wage feedback e®ect is
magni¯ed by the steady-state ratio of the marginal product of capital to Q or R=Q: Because the
steady-state Q is equal to the present value of R and the option value of waiting as revealed by
(36), the larger is the option value of waiting, the smaller is R=Q: We can show that holding the
adjustment rate and the investment trigger ¯xed, if more low ¯xed costs have high probabilities
or the ¯xed cost distribution is more right skewed, the option value of waiting is higher. In
this case, R=Q is smaller and thus the wage feedback e®ect is smaller.
In summary, both the micro-level investment lumpiness and the general equilibrium price
movements are important to determine aggregate dynamics. The relative importance of these
two e®ects is determined by the preference and technology parameters and the distribution of
the idiosyncratic ¯xed cost shock. In particular, holding preferences and technology ¯xed, if
10Even though this elasticity is an \endogenous" concept, we can compute it ex post in equilibrium. For the
power function distribution, the elasticity is equal to the shape parameter, which is exogenous.
17the steady-state elasticity of the adjustment rate is larger, then the extensive margin e®ect is
stronger. If the ¯xed cost distribution is more right skewed, then the general equilibrium wage
feedback e®ect is weaker.
4 Numerical Results
We evaluate our lumpy investment model quantitatively and compare this model with two
benchmark models. The ¯rst one is obtained by removing ¯xed adjustment costs only (»
j
t = 0).
We call this model the partial adjustment model. Its equilibrium system is given by (43)-(47).
The second one is a frictionless RBC model, obtained by removing all adjustment costs in the
model presented in Section 2. Its equilibrium system is obtained by setting µ = & = 0 and Ã = 1
in (44)-(47) and Qt = 1=zt. In both benchmark models, all ¯rms make identical decisions, and
thus these models are equivalent to standard representative-¯rm RBC models (e.g., Fisher
(2006) and Greenwood et al. (2000)). Because we have characterized the equilibria for all three
models by systems of nonlinear di®erence equations as shown in the previous section, we can
use the standard second-order approximation method to solve the models numerically.11 To do
so, we need ¯rst to calibrate the models.
4.1 Baseline Parametrization
For all model economies, we take the Cobb-Douglas production function, F (K;AN) = K® (AN)
1¡® ;
and the period utility function, U (C;1 ¡ N) = log(C) ¡ aN; where a > 0 is a parameter. We
¯x the length of period to correspond to one year, as in Thomas (2002), and Khan and Thomas
(2003, 2008). Annual frequency allows us to use empirical evidence on establishment-level
investment in selecting parameters for the ¯xed adjustment costs and the distribution of id-
iosyncratic investment-speci¯c shocks.
We ¯rst choose parameter values for preferences and technology to ensure that the steady-
state of the frictionless RBC model is consistent with the long-run values of key postwar U.S.
aggregates. Speci¯cally, we set the subjective discount factor to ¯ = 0:96, so that the implied
annual real interest rate is 4 percent (Prescott (1986)). We choose the value of a so that the
steady-state hours are about 1=3 of available time spent in market work. We set the capital
share ® = 0:36; implying a labor share of 0:64, which is close to the labor income share in the
NIPA. We take the depreciate rate ± = 0:1; as in the literature on business cycles (e.g., Prescott
(1986)).
11The Dynare code is available upon request.
18It is often argued that convex adjustment costs are not observable directly and hence cannot
be calibrated based on average data over the long run (e.g., Greenwood et al. (2000)). Thus,
we impose the two restrictions:




so that the partial adjustment model and the frictionless RBC model give identical steady-state
allocations.12 As in our paper, Baxter and Crucini (1993), Jermann (1998), and Greenwood et
al. (2000) make similar assumptions for the parameters in the adjustment cost function. We
assume condition (56) throughout our numerical experiments below.
We next follow Khan and Thomas (2003) to select parameters for the aggregate shocks.
They use Stock and Watson (1999) data set to estimate the persistence and volatility of
the Solow residuals equal to 0:9225 and 0:0134; respectively. Transforming the total fac-
tor productivity shocks to our labor-augmenting technology shocks, we set ½A = 0:9225 and
¾A = 0:0134=0:64 = 0:021: As in Khan and Thomas (2003), we set ½z = 0:706 and ¾z = 0:017 in
the investment-speci¯c technology shock process. Following Kiyotaki and West (1996), Thomas
(2002), and Khan and Thomas (2003), we set µ = 1=5:98; implying that the Q-elasticity of the
investment rate is 5.98.
We adopt the power function distribution for the idiosyncratic ¯xed cost shock. We need to
calibrate two parameters »max and ´: We try to match micro-level evidence on the investment
lumpiness reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) ¯nd
that the inaction rate is 0.081 and the positive spike rate is about 0.186. A positive investment
spike is de¯ned as the investment rate exceeding 0.2. For the power function distribution,
the steady-state inaction rate is given by 1 ¡ (»¤=»max)
´ and the steady-state investment rate
is given by equation (33). Because our model implies that the target investment rate I=K
is identical for all ¯rms, our model cannot match the spike rate. Therefore, there are many
combinations of ´ and »max to match the inaction rate. As baseline values, we follow Khan and
Thomas (2003, 2008) and take a uniform distribution (´ = 1): This implies that »max = 0:0242:
In this case, total ¯xed adjustment costs account for 2.4 percent of output, 10 percent of total
investment spending and 1.0 percent of capital stock, which are reasonable according to the
estimation by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
We summarize the baseline parameter values in Table 1.
12Under the log-linear approximation method, only the curvature parameter µ in the convex adjustment cost
function matters for the approximated equilibrium dynamics.
19Table 1. Baseline Parameter Vales
¯ a ® ± ½A ¾A ½z ¾z µ »max ´
0:9615 2:5843 0:36 0:1 0:9225 0:021 0:706 0:017 1=5:98 0.0242 1
4.2 Partial Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to understand the general equilibrium e®ects of ¯xed costs on business cycles, we
start with a partial equilibrium analysis by ¯xing the wage rate and the interest rate at their
steady state values. For the power function distribution, we can show that the elasticity of the
adjustment rate is equal to ´: Using assumption (56), the speci¯cation of the utility function
and the production function, and setting ^ wt = ^ rt = 0, we can rewrite equations (49) and (53)
as:





























Et ^ At+1: (58)
The last term in the square bracket in equation (58) represents the option value of waiting in
the presence of ¯xed costs. The log-linearized system for the partial adjustment model with
¯xed prices is obtained by setting ´ = 0 and ignoring equation (48).
We now analyze the impulse response properties based on the above log-linearized system.
Figure 1 plots the impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to the labor-
augmenting technology (N-shock). Following this shock, the marginal product capital rises.
Thus, the price of capital or the marginal Q rises. Because there is an option value of waiting,
the increase in Q is higher in the lumpy investment model than in the partial adjustment model.
The increase in Q has both intensive and extensive margin e®ects in the lumpy investment model
as revealed by equation (49). In particular, it raises the adjustment rate by 11 percent in the
lumpy investment model. Due to this extensive margin e®ect, the increase in the investment
rate in the lumpy investment model is higher than that in the partial adjustment model (22
percent versus 10 percent).
[Insert Figures 1-2 Here.]
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation shock to the
investment-speci¯c technology (I-shock). Following this shock, the marginal Q rises by the
same magnitude in both the lumpy investment and in the partial adjustment model because
20these two models deliver an identical coe±cient of ^ zt in (58). Even though the increase in
marginal Q is identical, the investment rate increases much more in the lumpy investment
model than in the partial adjustment model (15 percent versus 8 percent). The reason is
that the investment-speci¯c technology shock has a direct extensive margin e®ect by raising
the adjustment rate (see equation (48)). In particular, the adjustment rate rises by about 8
percent.
4.3 General Equilibrium Dynamics
We now turn to general equilibrium dynamics by endogenizing the prices. In this case, the
general equilibrium price movements play an important role in shaping aggregate dynamics.
To see this, we write the log-linearized equation for the marginal Q as:

















Et[At+1 ¡ ^ wt+1];
where the equilibrium interest rate and wage rate satisfy





^ wt = ^ Ct = (1 ¡ ®) ^ At + ®
³
^ Kt ¡ ^ Nt
´
:
In general equilibrium, a positive N-shock or I-shock raises the interest rate and the wage
rate, and thus dampens the increases in marginal Q or the price of capital, as revealed by
equation (59). As a result, both the extensive and intensive margin e®ects are weakened
in general equilibrium. Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) emphasize this
general equilibrium e®ect. They also ¯nd that movements in interest rates and wages yield
quantity dynamics that are virtually indistinguishable from a standard RBC model without
¯xed adjustment costs. However, we do not obtain this ¯nding because they use di®erent
numerical methods than ours. Their models are also di®erent than ours in that they assume
long-run growth and a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology. In addition, ¯xed costs in their
models are measured in terms of labor costs rather than capital.
[Insert Figures 3-4 Here.]
Figures 3-4 plot impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation N-shock. Compared
to Figure 1, the increase in the investment rate is about 10 times smaller in general equilibrium
for the lumpy investment and partial adjustment models than that in partial equilibrium. In
21addition, the responses in the lumpy investment and partial adjustment models are similar, but
the lumpy investment model brings predictions closer to those of the frictionless RBC model.
The intuition is that the partial adjustment model implies too sluggish responses of investment
due to convex adjustment costs. The extensive margin e®ect in the lumpy investment model
raises the responses of investment to shocks. But the price feedback e®ect partially o®sets this
extensive margin e®ect. Figure 4 shows that both the interest rate and the wage rate rise. As
a result, the increase in marginal Q in the lumpy investment model is much smaller in general
equilibrium than in partial equilibrium (0.1 percent versus 1.8 percent). This in turn causes the
adjustment rate to rise by less than 1 percent as revealed in Figure 3, compared to 11 percent
in partial equilibrium.
[Insert Figures 5-6 Here.]
Figures 5-6 plot the impulse responses to a positive one standard deviation I-shock. Com-
paring with Figure 2, we ¯nd that the e®ects on the investment rate is much smaller in general
equilibrium than in partial equilibrium. In addition, the impulse responses in the lumpy in-
vestment and the partial adjustment model are similar. In contrast to the partial equilibrium
case, a positive I-shock lowers marginal Q in both the lumpy investment and partial adjustment
models. The intuition follows from equation (59) and Figure 6. The increase in the interest
rate and the wage rate lowers the pro¯tability of the ¯rm and hence raises the cost of invest-
ment. This e®ect dominates the positive e®ect of investment-speci¯c technology shock on Q.
Why do the investment rate and the adjustment rate still rise? The reason is that the increase
in the I-shock decreases the price of new investment. Thus, it has a direct positive e®ect on
the investment trigger and the investment rate as revealed by equations (48) and (49), respec-
tively.13 However, the e®ect is smaller than that in partial equilibrium, due to the powerful
general equilibrium price feedback e®ect. Figure 5 shows that the adjustment rate rises by 1.5
percent only, which is much smaller than 8 percent in partial equilibrium.
Next, we turn to the business cycle moments properties. Table 2 presents standard devi-
ations, autocorrelations, and contemporaneous correlations for several model economies. We
¯rst consider the result for the frictionless RBC and partial adjustment models. It is well
known that the partial adjustment model delivers less volatile and more persistent equilibrium
quantities and prices than the frictionless RBC model because of the smoothing role of the con-
vex adjustment costs. We then introduce ¯xed costs into the partial adjustment model. Rows
13In contrast to the N-shock, the initial response of consumption is negative because investment crowds out
consumption as typical in models with investment-speci¯c technology shocks.
22labelled \Lumpy1" in Table 2 present the result for this lumpy investment model with the
baseline parameter values. They reveal that although impulse responses in the partial adjust-
ment model and the lumpy investment model are similar, the di®erence in the model predicted
second moments is non-negligible. The lumpy investment model delivers higher volatility in all
quantities and prices than the partial adjustment model as revealed in Panel A. In particular,
aggregate investment, the investment rate, and hours are 16, 13, and 28 percent, respectively,
more volatile in the lumpy investment model than in the partial adjustment model. Panel B of
Table 2 shows that the lumpy investment model predicts less persistent equilibrium quantities
and prices, which are closer to the predictions of the frictionless RBC model. Panel C of Table
2 presents contemporaneous correlations with output. Marginal Q is negatively correlated with
output for all models because a positive investment-speci¯c technology shock lowers the price
of capital directly. All other quantities and prices move positively with output. In summary,
Table 2 demonstrates that the predictions of the lumpy investment model are closer to those
of the standard frictionless RBC model. Thus, it also su®ers from a number of di±culties in
matching the US business cycle facts, as in the standard frictionless RBC model. Thomas
(2002) reports a similar ¯nding.
So far, we have shown that under the baseline calibration, the general equilibrium price
movements dampen the extensive margin e®ect signi¯cantly, making predictions of the lumpy
investment model and the partial adjustment model similar. We now illustrate that the shape
parameter of the distribution function of the idiosyncratic shock is important for the extensive
margin e®ect. We set ´ = 20 and re-calibrate »max = 0:02232 such that the inaction rate is equal
to 0:081. In this case, the elasticity of the adjustment rate is 20 times of that in the baseline
calibration so that the extensive margin e®ect is much larger. Of course, this calibration is
unreasonable because total ¯xed costs are too large, accounting for 4.3 percent of output, 19.1
percent of total investment spending, and 1.9 percent of capital stock.
Rows labelled \Lumpy2" in Table 2 present the result for this calibration. The result
reveals that the di®erence between the lumpy investment model and the partial adjustment
model becomes larger. In particular, aggregate investment in the lumpy investment model is
40 percent more volatile than in the partial adjustment model. The investment rate in the
lumpy investment model is 46 percent more volatile than in the partial adjustment model.
However, the di®erences in the autocorrelations and contemporaneous correlations across these
two models are small.
Gourio and Kashyap (2007) argue that for the extensive margin e®ect to be large in the
Thomas (2002) model, the ¯xed cost distribution must be su±ciently compressed in the sense
23Table 2. Business Cycle Moments
Y C I N Q I=K r w
A. Standard deviations (percentage)
PA 2.27 2.03 4.09 0.87 1.18 3.74 0.28 2.03
Lumpy1 2.41 2.12 4.74 1.11 1.22 4.41 0.36 2.12
Lumpy2 2.60 2.24 5.72 1.45 1.36 5.45 0.48 2.24
LumpyGK 2.59 2.22 5.44 1.46 1.32 5.11 0.46 2.22
RBC 2.81 2.36 7.58 1.95 1.67 7.46 0.60 2.36
B. Autocorrelations
PA 0.94 0.96 0.77 0.63 0.83 0.68 0.63 0.96
Lumpy1 0.93 0.96 0.73 0.60 0.78 0.64 0.60 0.96
Lumpy2 0.91 0.95 0.67 0.56 0.70 0.58 0.56 0.95
LumpyGK 0.92 0.95 0.70 0.58 0.72 0.61 0.58 0.95
RBC 0.89 0.93 0.64 0.57 0.70 0.58 0.57 0.93
C. Contemporaneous correlations with output
PA 1 0.92 0.83 0.45 -0.21 0.33 0.09 0.92
Lumpy1 1 0.89 0.81 0.47 -0.32 0.34 0.20 0.89
Lumpy2 1 0.83 0.80 0.51 -0.43 0.37 0.32 0.83
LumpyGK 1 0.83 0.83 0.51 -0.42 0.39 0.32 0.83
RBC 1 0.73 0.78 0.56 -0.53 0.43 0.44 0.73
Notes: All variables are in logarithms. RBC: the standard real business cycle model. PA: the
partial adjustment model. Lumpy1: our lumpy investment model under the baseline calibration
in Table 1. Lumpy2: our lumpy investment model with power function distribution where
´ = 20 and »max = 0:02232. LumpyGK: our lumpy investment model with our calibrated
Gourio and Kashyap (2007) distribution.
24that many ¯rms must face nearly identical ¯xed costs. We have argued in Proposition 6
that the key determinant of the extensive margin e®ect is the steady-state elasticity of the
adjustment rate, but not the compression property. We now take the Gourio and Kashyap
(2007) distribution H(»=»max) in our lumpy investment model, where H(x) =
h(x)¡h(0)
h(1)¡h(0) and
h(x) = [arctan(¾1(x ¡ Â)) + arctan(¾2(x ¡ 1))]=(2¼); for Â 2 (0;1). This distribution has the
property that most ¯rms bunch around »max and Â»max: As in Gourio and Kashyap (2007),
we set ¾1 = 150 and ¾2 = 33:3. Unlike their distribution with Â = 0:5, we set Â = 0:05 so
that there are many ¯rms having small ¯xed costs at the size of 5 percent of »max: We then set
»max = 0:022494 to match the inaction rate of 0.081. In this case, total ¯xed costs are smaller
than those in our baseline calibration. They account for 1:42 percent of output, 5:75 percent
of total investment spending, and 0:58 percent of capital stock. However, the e®ect of lumpy
investment is much larger than in the baseline calibration, as shown in Table 2.
Rows labelled \LumpyGK" in Table 2 present the result for the Gourio-Kashyap distri-
bution. We ¯nd that our calibrated Gourio-Kashyap distribution and the power function
distribution with ´ = 20 deliver similar second moments, but the former distribution gives
slightly less volatile investment and investment rate. To see the intuition, we compute the
steady-state elasticities of the adjustment rate with respect to the investment trigger for the
Gourio-Kashyap distribution and for the power function distribution. We ¯nd they are equal
to 6:28 and 20 respectively. As a result, the extensive margin e®ect for the Gourio-Kashyap
distribution is smaller, justifying less volatile investment. But why is the di®erence in equilib-
rium second moments for the two distributions so small? The intuition comes from the general
equilibrium price feedback e®ect. As Proposition 6 shows, the magnitude of the wage feedback
e®ect is determined by the state-steady ratio R=Q: We ¯nd that it is equal to 0:145 for the
Gourio-Kashyap distribution, which is smaller than the value 0:159 for the power function dis-
tribution with ´ = 20; because the Gourio-Kashyap distribution is more right skewed than the
power function distribution. Thus, the price feedback e®ect is smaller for the Gourio-Kashyap
distribution, which makes the powerful dampening e®ect on investment much smaller.
5 Conclusion
We have presented an analytically tractable general equilibrium business cycle model that
features micro-level investment lumpiness. We prove that a competitive equilibrium exists and
is unique and constrained e±cient. We also prove an exact irrelevance proposition, which states
that under some conditions aggregate dynamics are identical for any positive upper support
25of the ¯xed cost distribution. Within our framework, we give conditions under which lumpy
investment can be important to a ¯rst-order approximation. Essentially, we need the ¯xed
cost distribution to satisfy two conditions: (i) The steady-state elasticity of the adjustment
rate is large so that the extensive margin e®ect is large. (ii) The ¯xed cost distribution is
right skewed so that the general equilibrium price feedback is small. We show numerically that
introducing ¯xed costs to a model with convex adjustment costs raises business cycle volatility,
but reduces persistence of output, consumption, investment, and hours. In addition, when
lumpy investment becomes more important, it brings business cycle moments closer to those
in the standard frictionless RBC model.
Our model serves as a theoretical benchmark for understanding the general equilibrium
e®ect of lumpy investment. It can be used as a benchmark to check the accuracy of various
numerical methods applied in the lumpy-investment literature. Our model is stylized and
not designed to match all micro-level and macro-level empirical evidence. One limitation of
our model is that it is not suitable for addressing distributional asymmetry and aggregate
nonlinearity. To address this issue, it is necessary to relax the assumption of constant returns
to scale. In this case, the distribution of capital is a state variable and we are unable to derive
a closed-form solution. One has to use a numerical method to approximate the distribution
of capital. It would be interesting to apply and compare various recently developed numerical
methods reviewed in den Haan (2010a).
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A Proofs























































De¯ne V n (Kt;At;zt) as the price of capital when the ¯rm chooses not to invest. It satis¯es:
V n (Kt;At;zt) = Rt + (1 ¡ ± + &)Qt; (A.3)
which is independent of »
j


















Clearly, there is a unique cuto® value »¤
t given in (22) satisfying the condition:
V a (Kt;At;zt;»¤











Because the support of »
j
t is [0;»max]; the investment trigger is given by minf»¤
t ;»maxg:
When »¤


















[V a (Kt;At;zt;») ¡ V n (Kt;At;zt)]Á(»)d»:
27We use equations (A.2), (A.3) and (22) to derive








µ ¡ » (A.7)
= »¤
t ¡ »:
Using the above two equations, (A.3), and (21), we obtain (24). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: From (12), we deduce that all ¯rms choose the same labor-capital






























tdj = F (1;Atnt)Kt = F (Kt;AtNt);




AtF2(Kt;AtNt) = wt: (A.8)
By the constant return to scale property of F; we also have:
Rt = F1(Kt;AtNt): (A.9)

























where the second equality uses the de¯nition of i
j
t; the third equality uses a law of large numbers
and the optimal investment rule (23). We thus obtain (26).












Substituting optimal investment in equation (23) and using equation (26), we obtain (27).
Equation (30) follows from substituting equations (9), (26), (25), and (A.9) into equation
(24). Equation (29) follows from equations (9), (10) and (A.8). Finally, equation (28) follows
from a law of large number, the market clearing condition (11), and Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
28Proof of Proposition 3: Given Á0 ¸ 0 and the assumptions on preferences and technology
made in Section 2, we can easily check that the social planner problem is a standard concave
problem. Thus, the solution exists and unique (See Stokey and Lucas (1989)). Let ¸t and ¸tQt
be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (28) and (27), respectively. We derive the following
¯rst-order conditions:
Ct : U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt) = ¸t; (A.10)
Nt : U2 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt) = ¸tAtF2 (Kt;AtNt); (A.11)










Kt+1 : ¸tQt = Et¯¸t+1
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Equation (A.12) gives (26). Equations (A.10) and (A.11) together give equation (29). Using











Using this equation and equations (A.12) and (A.13), we can derive (30). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We ¯rst observe that the deterministic steady-state values of At















From these two equations, we obtain:
I
K





29In steady state, equation (27) becomes:










Substituting equation (A.18) into the above equation yields equation (31). The expression on
the right-hand side of this equation increases with »¤. Given the condition in this proposition,
there is a unique interior solution »¤ 2 [0;»max]:
Equation (32) follows from (A.17). Equations (A.18) and (A.19) imply that:










From this equation and equation (32), we obtain (33). The other equations in the proposition
follow from the steady-state versions of equations (29)-(30). Q.E.D.
















We can then use equation (31) to derive equation (38). Equation (38) implies that the invest-
ment trigger »¤ increases with »max: It follows from equation (32) and (33) that Q and I=K
also increase with »max:
Using equation (A.18), we can compute the steady-state value of the ratio of option value
of waiting to the investment rate:
R »¤




0 [»¤ ¡ »]Á(»)d»
1¡µ













Using this equation and equation (33), we derive the steady-state value of the ratio of the
option value to the price of capital:
R »¤

















Substituting it into equation (36), we obtain:
Q =
¯
1 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ± + &)
(











30This equation implies that:

















Thus, by (A.21), R=Q is independent of »max:







®(± ¡ &)(1 ¡ µ)
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which is independent of »max: We next compute the ratio of total ¯xed costs to output using































max (1 ¡ µ)
µ
=
®´=(´ + 1)(± ¡ &)µ
1




which is independent of »max:












Thus, C=Y is independent of »max:
To show N is independent of »max; we use the assumption on preferences and the steady-
state version of equation (35) to derive:
(1 ¡ ®)Y
N
= Cv0 (1 ¡ N) or
Cv0 (1 ¡ N)
1 ¡ °
: (A.25)
We obtain the desired result because C=Y is independent of »max:
Because Q increases with »max and R=Q is independent of »max; R must increase with »max.
Since R = f0(k) and @R=@»max > 0; we must have @k=@»max < 0, where k = K=N: Because
N is independent of »max; we obtain @K=@»max < 0 . Since w = f(k) ¡ f0(k)k, so we have




@»max < 0. Since Y = F(K;N); we have @Y=@»max < 0. Since C=Y
and I=Y are independent of »max, we also have @C=@»max < 0 and @I=@»max < 0. Q.E.D.
31Proof of Proposition 5: We focus on the utility function U (C;1 ¡ N) = C1¡°
1¡° v(1 ¡ N),
where ° > 0;6= 1. The proof for the other utility function in the proposition is similar. We
then have ¤t = C
¡°
t v(1 ¡ Nt), and
U2 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt)







Using Proposition 2 and the assumptions, we can characterize the equilibrium dynamics by the







































































Using the steady-state equations from Corollary 1 and the de¯nition of normalization,
Xt = X ~ Xt for any variable Xt, we can rewrite the above system of di®erence equations as
follows:












~ Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ± + &) ~ Kt +





















~ Ctv0(1 ¡ N ~ Nt)




(1 ¡ ®)~ Yt
N ~ Nt
; (A.34)
~ Yt = ~ K®

























t+1v(1 ¡ N ~ Nt+1)
~ C
¡°






+ (1 ¡ ± + &) ~ Qt+1
R »¤








32Note that equation (A.22) implies:
R »¤









The dynamics of the above system of nonlinear di®erence equations are fully determined by the
steady-state ratios R=Q and C=Y; I=Y and the steady-state value N, structural parameters
f®;¯;°;±;Ã;&;µ;´g; the function v(1¡N); and the process of exogenous technology shocks ~ At
and ~ zt. By Corollary 1, R=Q, C=Y , I=Y and the steady-state value N are independent of the
nonconvex adjustment costs parameter »max: Thus, we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: We log-linearize the nonlinear dynamic system in Proposition 2
and obtain equations (51), (49), (48), (50), (52) and
^ Qt + uC;C ^ Ct ¡ uC;N ^ Nt = Et
³
uC;C ^ Ct+1 ¡ uC;N ^ Nt+1
´






fKK ^ Kt+1 + fKN( ^ At+1 + ^ Nt+1)
i






where we have used (A.15) in (30) to derive the above equation. Following King, Plosser
and Rebelo (2002), we denote the elasticities of marginal utility to its arguments by uN;C =
CU21(C;1¡N)
U2(C;1¡N) , uN;N =
NU22(C;1¡N)
U2(C;1¡N) , uC;C =
CU11(C;1¡N)
U1(C;1¡N) , uC;N =
NU12(Ct;1¡N)
U1(C;1¡N) : We then log-
linearize equation (29) to obtain equation (55). We log-linearize the equation U1 (Ct;1 ¡ Nt) =
¯Et [U (Ct+1;1 ¡ Nt+1)rt+1] to obtain (54).
We now use equation (49) to derive
¯µ(± ¡ &)Et(^ It+1 ¡ ^ Kt+1) = ¯(± ¡ &)Et
"































Using this equation and plugging equation (A.38) into (A.37), we obtain:
^ Qt + uC;C ^ Ct ¡ uC;N ^ Nt (A.39)
= Et
³
uC;C ^ Ct+1 ¡ uC;N ^ Nt+1
´











( ^ At+1 + ^ Nt+1)
¸
:
33Because F is linearly homogenous, we have
NF22 + KF21 = 0; KF11 + NF12 = 0:






























^ Kt+1 ¡ ^ At+1 ¡ ^ Nt+1
´
:
Using the above two equations, we can derive equation (53) from equation (A.39). Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to an N-shock in partial equilibrium. This ¯gure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) to a standard deviation positive shock to the labor-
augmenting technology in partial equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model. Lumpy: lumpy
investment model.










































































Figure 2: Impulse responses to an I-shock in partial equilibrium. This ¯gure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) to a standard deviation positive shock to the
investment-speci¯c technology in partial equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model. Lumpy:
lumpy investment model.











































Figure 3: Impulse responses to an N-shock in general equilibrium. This ¯gure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of quantities to a standard deviation positive shock
to the labor-augmenting technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.


























Figure 4: Impulse responses to an N-shock in general equilibrium. This ¯gure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of prices to a standard deviation positive shock
to the labor-augmenting technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.











































Figure 5: Impulse responses of an I-shock in general equilibrium. This ¯gure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of quantities to a standard deviation positive shock
to the investment-speci¯c technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.
























Figure 6: Impulse responses of an I-shock in general equilibrium. This ¯gure plots
impulse responses (measured in percentage) of prices to a standard deviation positive shock
to the investment-speci¯c technology in general equilibrium. PA: partial adjustment model.
Lumpy: lumpy investment model. RBC: frictionless RBC model.
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